This paper examines the effects of political parties, executive power and efficiency on federal structure. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different levels of veto power can lead to varying degrees of centralization in the provision of central and local governmental services when executive and legislative branches have disparate preferences over which level should provide services. Results for the US (1982US ( -1992 find state and local spending centralizes with increased veto power because, absent offsetting political party advocacy for decentralization, central government spending interests dominate local government spending interests.
INTRODUCTION
There is a general expectation in the U.S. that the line-item veto at the Federal level will limit special interest legislation, helping to "bring government under control." However, theoretical Carter and Schap's (1987, 1990) contributions on veto authority with Becker's (1983 Becker's ( , 1985 
THEORETICAL MODEL
The model is located at the intersection of the literature on veto power as an institutional constraint and optimal federalism. In Figure 1 assume the preferences of E and L are such that indifference curves are concentric circles about the actors' most preferred budgets. Following Carter and Schap (1987, 1990) , in As Carter and Schap (1987) point out, veto power varies directly with the permissiveness of the veto rule: greater veto 9 power in Figure 1 results in higher levels of utility for E and lower levels for L. However, the effect of veto power on expenditure centralization (e.g., the ratio of CS to LS) is less clear. The budget x r has a higher ratio of central spending to local spending than x i . However, x i does not in general have a higher ratio than x a . Which of these two points has a higher ratio depends on where these two points lie relative to the origin. As one can see, if the intercept is above the origin (as in Figure   1 ), the ratio is higher at x i ; if the intercept is below the origin, the ratio is higher at x a . The same qualification applies to the x r versus x a comparison. The politically optimal points x E and x L , and thus the 10 combination of CS and LS resulting from a particular veto rule, reflect also efficiencies available from optimal federalism.
Becker's (1983) model implies policies increasing efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies decreasing efficiency.
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Applying his model here, where there is greater potential governmental failure in terms of a large inefficiency in federal structure, there is greater pressure for optimal federal structure. As a result, x E and x L reflect both political support for optimal federalism as well as the political pressures arising from geographically based interests and partisan preferences.
Assume increases in population yield local governments economies of scale so that all or some portion of a service becomes less costly than central provision. A proposal is made to substitute an equal amount of local for central production financed by an intergovernmental transfer equal the amount being spent on more costly central production. Applying Becker's (1983) model, the net subsidy above cost to local governments yields an advantage of local spending interests to exert more pressure than central spending interests of the same size, efficiency of organization, and political appeal. In his model inefficient policies not only lead to relatively less pressure from groups subsidized by inefficiency, but also encourage pressure from taxpayers for efficiency. Thus, in Figure 1 x E and x L and the equilibrium induced by a given veto rule shift to the southeast.
Alternatively, consider a decrease in the land area of a 11 central government and its implications for optimal federal structure. Hochman, Pines, and Thisse (1995) What about the impact of the number of poor on the provision of redistributional services? Becker (1985) considers the following scenario. As the number of poor increases, they may tend to out-vote the middle class and rich and tax away their wealth.
However, a larger number of poor face two political handicaps.
Larger groups face greater difficulties controlling free riding and shirking. And, political support for greater redistribution withers away with the rising excess burden of taxation on the middle and rich class. Thus, a rising number of poor may increase, decrease, or leave unchanged redistribution.
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Redistributional policies are the result of the influence of political pressures arising from recipients (including the poor, young, and old) and nonrecipients. The value nonrecipients place on redistribution may depend both on their own characteristics and on the characteristics of the recipients. Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser (1993) point out that nonrecipients may care about recipients in an "even-handed" way, where concern for recipients depends on their needs but not their identities. They also argue that nonrecipients may care about the consumption of recipients in discriminatory fashion, where concern about recipients depends on their similarity to nonrecipients. In the discriminatory model nonrecipients place more weight on transfers to people of their own ethnicity or race than to others. While any model of governmental redistribution would allow for responses varying with the demographic characteristics of the recipient population, the discriminatory model also has the degree of demographic fragmentation or diversity as a determinant of transfer spending.
In the model here, with discriminatory nonrecipient preferences an increase in demographic diversity decreases redistributional services at the central and local levels. The resulting change in expenditure centralization depends on the relative size of these effects. With even-handed preferences an increase in demographic fragmentation has no effect. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL
where: handed," DEMFRAG has no effect on CENT.
Equation (1) Because pressures from spending interests (e.g., those
receiving and paying for a service and those employed in its provision) empirically cannot be distinguished from pressures for optimality (e.g., the balancing of the benefits and costs of spending), these results imply nothing about optimality. In section 2, CENT is the result of the veto rule as well as executive and legislative preferences, with tastes reflecting the pressures from central and local spending interests as well as 21 political support for optimal federalism. Thus, for example, enhanced veto power and increased CENT may go along with increased efficiency, substituting more efficient state provision for state transfers financing local spending of the "pork barrel" variety.
Alternatively, increased CENT be associated with decreased efficiency, matching less the provision of services with varying geographic tastes.
In Table 3 
CONCLUSIONS
Because the American press has focused more on rivalry 2 Carter and Schap (1987) demonstrate, even when the executive systematically prefers less spending than legislators, a switch from an all-or-nothing veto to a line-item veto can decrease or increase budget levels. Similarly, Dearden and Husted (1990) show an increase in authority from the line-item to the item-reduction veto may lead to more spending, leaving the executive further from his most preferred budget.
3. Abrams and Dougan (1986) and Nice (1988) conclude the line-item veto authority has no systematic impact on spending.
Holtz-Eakin (1988) finds the line-item veto restrains spending in the short run, an effect most pronounced when a governor encounters a legislature dominated by the opposing political party without the votes to override. However, the line-item veto has no effect on long-run variations in budgets, even allowing for political circumstances. Alm and Evers (1991) 4. Rowley, Shugart, and Tollison (1987) find the line-item 26 veto does not affect the level of state borrowing. Carter and Schap (1990) conclude the line-item veto has no effect on the value of the governor's office (as proxied by campaign spending)
or the incumbent's share of the two-party vote. Also, they find that the proportion of governors later elected (or nominated) to the U.S. Senate from line-item veto states is smaller than the proportion of governors without such veto authority.
5. Dearden and Husted (1993) 8. Becker's paper builds on earlier work by Olson (1965) , Stigler (1971), and Peltzman (1976 Carter and Schap (1990). 28 12. The discussion here follows by analogy Poterba's (1994 Poterba's ( , 1996 analysis of potential endogeneity in the relation between fiscal policy and balanced budget requirements at the state level in the U.S.
13. Wallis and Oates (1988) provide an historical overview of the twentieth century evolution in the U.S. toward centralization in the provision of state and local service. Because of the availability of data over this time period, they have a more limited choice of explanatory variables. As in Table 3 , they find centralization (in 1982) inversely related to land area and population. They also find centralization is positively related to population living on farms. When this variable is included in equation (1), it is statistically insignificant and has no impact on the results reported here. Reported results are also unaffected when the total number of local governments is included to capture possible diseconomies of scale.
14. Studies find effects of discriminatory preferences in the provision of both state and local services. Orr (1976) finds welfare benefits decline as states' nonwhite fraction of welfare recipients increases. Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser (1993) find demographic characteristics such as race and age have markedly different impacts on the levels of county and state spending. Poterba (1997) finds support for public education declines when the racial compositions of beneficiaries and voters diverge. Baicker (1997) finds states, responding to mandated 29 Medicaid spending, cut welfare more strongly when the population is more racially fragmented. Luttmer (1998) finds voters prefer to spend more on welfare when they are of the same race as likely recipients. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find shares of city spending on public goods like education and roads decrease as ethnic diversity increases. 
